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HOUSING GIDEON: THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
IN EVICTION CASES
Rachel Kleinman*
INTRODUCTION
In Gideon v. Wainwright, Justice Black commented that "reason
and reflection require us to recognize that in our adversary sys-
tem of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too
poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel
is provided for him. This seems to us to be an obvious truth."1
Since Justice Black made this proclamation in 1963, most Ameri-
cans intuitively accept the idea of an indigent's constitutional right
to counsel in a criminal trial. While lawmakers and advocates de-
bate over how best to deliver these services, and whether or not the
right is being met adequately, they generally do not question
whether the right exists.2 Neither the legislative nor the judicial
branch, however, has recognized an analogous right to counsel in
civil matters. Though government sponsored legal services, public
interest law offices and organizations, and pro bono programs at
private firms provide legal services to indigent clients, the legal ser-
vices provided to indigents in civil cases fall far short of the number
that are provided to people who are able to pay for legal help.4
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Comment to my mother whose support has been unwavering, and my father who will
always be my inspiration as a lawyer.
1. 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
2. See Kim Taylor-Thompson, The Legal Profession: Looking Backward: Tuning
Up Gideon's Trumpet, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1461, 1462 (2003) (examining the Su-
preme Court's lack of guidance regarding the representation requirement); see gener-
ally Stephen B. Bright, Neither Equal nor Just: The Rationing and Denial of Legal
Services to the Poor When Life and Liberty Are at Stake, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 783
(1997) (recognizing that while the right to counsel exists in criminal cases, indigents
often receive insufficient or no counsel).
3. See infra Part I (discussing the holding of Gideon v. Wainwright and the argu-
ments that the holding should apply to civil cases).
4. See Gary Bellow & Jeanne Kettleson, From Ethics to Politics: Confronting
Scarcity and Fairness in Public Interest Practice, 58 B.U. L. REV. 337, 342 (1978) (not-
ing the gap between available legal services and the level of services needed to pro-
vide representation to indigents).
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Scholars and practitioners make both constitutional and ethical
arguments for the expansion of legal services and for the recogni-
tion of a right to counsel for the indigent client in civil matters.5
The correct functioning of the adversarial process itself relies on
the assumption that both sides are coming to the process with
equal legal resources. 6 Equality of resources, however, is fre-
quently not a reality for indigent litigants.7 In the area of housing
law and evictions, for example, advocates have argued that recog-
nizing a right to counsel is the only way for government to mini-
mize the effect of inequality in access to justice, and, in many cases,
the only way to prevent homelessness.8 Others have cited both
feasibility and public policy in arguments against recognizing a
right to counsel in eviction proceedings. 9
Part I of this comment lays out some of the arguments for recog-
nizing a right to counsel for indigents as well as some of the pro-
posed solutions for making such a right a reality, focusing on the
arguments made in favor of extending a right to counsel for indi-
gents involved in eviction proceedings.' 0 Part II discusses some of
the problematic aspects of recognizing the right to counsel for indi-
gent tenants, including Barbara Bezdek's critique of reliance on
"access to justice" strategies"1 and Gary Bellow and Jeanne Ket-
5. See infra Part I (outlining arguments for recognizing a right to counsel in civil
cases).
6. See Russell Engler, And Justice For All-Including the Unrepresented Poor:
Revisiting Roles of the Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM. L. REV. 1987,
2022 (1999) ("The adversarial system presumes that both sides will be represented by
counsel."); see generally Deborah L. Rhode, The Constitution of Equal Citizenship for
a Good Society: Access to Justice, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785 (2001) (discussing the
connection between "equal justice under the law" and the assistance of council).
7. See, e.g., Simran Bindra & Pedram Ben-Cohen, Public Civil Defenders: A
Right to Counsel for Indigent Civil Defendants, 10 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 1,
1 (2003) (noting that in some civil courts ninety percent of defendants are without
council) (citing Engler, supra note 6, at 2047 n.263).
8. See Andrew Scherer, Gideon's Shelter: The Need to Recognize a Right to
Counsel for Indigent Defendants in Eviction Proceedings, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
557, 561 (1988) (advocating appointment of counsel for indigent tenants faced with
eviction and exploring the statutory bases for such an appointment); see generally Ken
Karas, Recognizing a Right to Counsel for Indigent Tenants in Eviction Proceedings in
New York, 24 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 527 (1991) (analyzing the housing problems
encountered by poor New York tenants and arguing for a right to counsel in housing
proceedings).
9. See infra Part II (discussing various arguments against recognizing a right to
counsel for indigents in eviction hearings).
10. See infra Part I (outlining arguments in favor of a right to counsel for indigents
in eviction proceedings).
11. Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participation and Subordination of Poor
Tenants' Voices in Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 533, 539-42 (1992) (noting that
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tleson's arguments against using the wholesale expansion of legal
services as a strategy for ameliorating inequality in the civil justice
system.12 Part III argues that despite these important criticisms, a
strong doctrinal basis as well as a deep need-especially in the case
of eviction proceedings-to recognize a right to counsel for indi-
gents still exists. 3
I. IN FAVOR OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL FOR INDIGENTS IN
EVICTION PROCEEDINGS
In 1963, the Supreme Court held in Gideon v. Wainwright 4 that
the Constitution guarantees every person charged with a felony the
right to an attorney even if he or she cannot afford one.' 5 Since the
Supreme Court recognized the Constitutional right to counsel in
criminal cases, advocates have argued for a civil version of
Gideon. 6 Proponents of this right argue that in many civil cases
the stakes are as high as those in criminal cases, and consequently
the concept of equitable access to justice is empty without a recog-
nized right to counsel in these cases. 7
A. Equal Protection Argument
Advocates for the right to counsel for indigent litigants have ar-
gued that indigents have a right to counsel in civil cases under the
Equal Protection Clause. 18 Generally, if a law "neither burdens a
fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, [a court] will uphold
the legislative classification so long as it bears a rational relation to
some legitimate end."'19 This rational basis test is relatively easy for
"access to justice" systems emanate from a viewpoint that separates law from other
political and social realms and places law in an artificial position of power).
12. Bellow & Kettleson, supra note 4, at 380.
13. See infra Part III.
14. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
15. Id. at 339 (overruling Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), which held that de-
nying a request for court-appointed counsel by an indigent defendant facing a state
felony charge was not necessarily a violation of the Due Process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment).
16. See infra notes 17-108 and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., Leonard W. Schroeter, Civil Gideon: If Not Why Not?, ATJ JURIS-
PRUDENCE, June 1999, passim (providing a detailed history of the right to counsel and
the "Civil Gideon" movement, and arguing that the fundamental right of access to
justice "encompasses a right to counsel in civil cases"), available at
http://www.wsba.org/atj/committees/jurisprudence/civgid.doc.
18. See Bindra & Ben-Cohen, supra note 7, at 12 (asserting that "equality before
the law" cannot exist unless both litigants in a case have access to the court system on
equal terms).
19. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (citation omitted).
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a government actor to satisfy.2 ° If the court determines that legis-
lation burdens a fundamental right or discriminates based on a sus-
pect classification, however, it will apply a "more searching judicial
inquiry. ' 21 In order to persuade a court to apply the much tougher
"strict scrutiny" analysis to determine whether a right to counsel
exists in civil proceedings, one would have to prove either that the
assistance of council is a fundamental right, or that discrimination
based on wealth should be considered a suspect category.22
Leonard Schroeter argues that the right to counsel should be
considered a fundamental right.23 This right, he argues, is a prod-
uct of natural law, and can be seen in American jurisprudential
tradition most clearly in the Declaration of Independence.24
Schroeter notes that most scholars see the Declaration of Indepen-
dence as asserting the "self-evident truths of individual dignity, the
right to be treated equally, and rights that cannot be taken from us
which are classified as life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. "25
And, Schroeter argues, the most essential of these fundamental
rights is access to justice, a right that cannot be recognized without
the courts also recognizing a right to counsel.26 Proving that a right
is "fundamental," however, is an extremely tough hurdle in almost
any context.27 For a right to be considered fundamental, the court
considers whether the right is explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by
the Constitution.28 It is unlikely that the right to counsel in civil
cases would be considered fundamental.29
A court could also apply a strict scrutiny test if it considered
those living in poverty a suspect class.3" Although the Court gener-
20. See Bindra & Ben-Cohen, supra note 7, at 19 (observing that under a rational
basis standard, the judiciary generally gives deference to the legislature).
21. United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 153-54 n.4 (1938); see also Sha-
piro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 658 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (detailing the strict
scrutiny test) (citations omitted).
22. See Bindra & Ben-Cohen, supra note 7, at 19-31.
23. Schroeter, supra note 17, at 62.
24. Id. at 62-63.
25. Id. at 64.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 20 (explaining that a right is not fundamental unless it is "explicitly or
implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution") (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973) (finding that education has never been considered
a fundamental right)).
28. Id.
29. See infra note 27 and accompanying text.
30. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (race,
alienage, and national origin are suspect classes); see also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343
(1996) (finding that claiming discrimination based on poverty will not merit a strict
scrutiny analysis unless a group could show absolute deprivation).
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31ally reserves this category for discrimination based on race, in
Griffin v. Illinois,32 a case regarding the provision of free trial tran-
scripts to indigent defendants, the Supreme Court held that une-
qual treatment based on economic need is as impermissible as
discrimination based on "religion, race, or color. ' 33 In a later case
addressing the right to counsel for indigents in criminal appeals,
however, Justice Clark wrote in the dissent that the Equal Protec-
tion Clause
does not impose on the States an affirmative duty to lift the
handicaps flowing from differences in economic circumstances.
To so construe it would be to read into the Constitution a philos-
ophy of leveling that would be foreign to many of our basic con-
cepts of the proper relations between government and society.
The State may have a moral obligation to eliminate the evils of
poverty, but it is not required by the Equal Protection Clause to
give to some whatever others can afford.34
In 1973, the Court appeared to embrace Justice Clark's view
when it held in San Antonio v. Rodriguez that the poor were not a
suspect class triggering strict scrutiny.35 In its holding, the Court
reasoned that, "at least where wealth is involved, the Equal Protec-
tion Clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal
advantages. '36 Thus, though cases like Griffin provide some hope,
an argument for a right to counsel based on an Equal Protection
argument is unlikely to prevail since it would necessitate a court
recognizing a new fundamental right or suspect class, which the Su-
preme Court has been reluctant to do.37
B. Due Process
In his article arguing for the recognition of a constitutional right
to counsel for indigents in eviction proceedings, Andrew Scherer
employs a procedural Due Process argument rather than an Equal
Protection one to argue that poor people have a legal right to
counsel when threatened by landlords with eviction from their
31. See, e.g., City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
32. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
33. Id. at 17.
34. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 362 (1963) (Clark, J., dissenting) (internal
citations omitted).
35. 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (finding that Texas's school financing system based on
property taxes did not violate the Constitution).
36. Id. at 24.
37. See Jennifer E. Watson, When No Place Is Home. Why the Homeless Deserve
Suspect Classification, 88 IOWA L. REV. 501, 511 (2003).
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homes.38 His article also argues that the promises of Gideon, with
respect to fair and equitable access to justice, have fallen short in
terms of the real lives of those living in poverty.39
In Mathews v. Eldridge,40 the Supreme Court created the test for
determining what constitutional due process is required when
someone is facing the loss of property.4 The framework requires
the balancing of three factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official ac-
tion; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such inter-
est through the procedures used and the probable value, if any,
of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally,
the Government's interest, including the function involved and
the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or sub-
stitute procedural requirement would entail.42
Scherer applies the Mathews balancing test to the hypothetical of
a poor tenant faced with the loss of her home.43 He identifies the
interest at stake for indigent tenants in the case of eviction as both
a property interest and a liberty interest.44 He argues that a tenant
has a property interest in her home. A person or family that loses
in an eviction proceeding is faced with the loss of the place where
they live, and possibly the loss of possessions within the home.46
Scherer probes deeper to identify the liberty interest involved in
eviction proceedings. Quoting Allgeyer v. Louisiana,47 he defines
liberty as "'the right of the citizen ... to use [his faculties] in all
lawful ways, to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood
by any lawful calling; to pursue any lawful trade or vocation." 48
38. Scherer, supra note 8, at 557.
39. Id. at 562.
40. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
41. Id. at 349 (holding, in part, that "an evidentiary hearing is not required prior to
the termination of [Social Security] disability benefits and that the present administra-
tive procedures fully comport with due process").
42. Id. at 335.
43. Scherer, supra note 8, at 562-79 (concluding that applying the three-factor Ma-
thews balancing test to the case of an indigent person faced with eviction supports
guaranteeing appointment of counsel).
44. Id. at 564-69.
45. Id. at 564 ("The right of the tenant to continued occupancy of his home is a
traditionally recognized property right.").
46. See id. at 564-66 (discussing the possibility that the tenant might lose his or her
home and become homeless); Evi Schueller, Unconscionable Due Process for Public
Housing Tenants, 37 U.C. DAvIs. L. REV. 1175, 1183-85 (2004) (discussing the consti-
tutionality of civil asset forfeiture).
47. 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
48. Scherer, supra note 8, at 567 (quoting Allgeyer, 165 U.S. at 589) (alterations in
original).
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He thus identifies any procedure or policy that infringes on "the
fundamental rights of liberty" as a restraint on the individual's lib-
erty interest.49
According to Scherer, the liberty interest in the case of eviction
proceedings "is one which falls within the rubric enunciated by the
Supreme Court in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services."5 In
Lassiter, the Court refused to recognize a right to counsel for peo-
ple faced with termination of their parental rights.5 1 In his decision
for the majority, Justice Stewart derives from precedent "the pre-
sumption that an indigent litigant has a right to appointed counsel
only when, if he loses, he may be deprived of his physical liberty.
52
Since the risk of eviction for the indigent tenant also carries with
it the risk of homelessness, Scherer argues that the liberty interest
involved in a poor person losing their home rises to the level of a
deprivation of physical liberty as required by Lassiter.53  As
Scherer points out, those who live on the street or in shelter sys-
tems are at risk for incarceration and institutionalization.5 4 And,
even when they are free from prisons and other institutions, they
are subject to severe restraints on their liberty.
Scherer's argument that eviction proceedings implicate physical
liberty is demonstrated in the case of United States v. Leasehold
Interest in 121 Nostrand Avenue,56 an action to enforce a forfeiture
statute against public housing tenants. In this case, the court dis-
cussed the damaging effects of homelessness and poverty in New
York City.57 Speaking of what would happen to the Smiths, the
family involved in the case if it were to lose its housing, the court
said that, despite the overcrowding in the family's apartment, the
family would be better off in its home "than they would be as at-
omized individuals in the streets, foster homes or shelters of New
York. Exclusion from their apartment risks driving the eighteen
Smith family residents far below a minimum standard for civilized
living. "58
49. Id. at 567 (defining this individual liberty interest as fundamental under the
Constitution).
50. Id. at 568.
51. 452 U.S. 18, 19 (1981).
52. Id. at 26-27.
53. Scherer, supra note 8, at 568.
54. Id.
55. Id. (noting that the homeless are at a greater risk of developing various dis-
eases and physical problems).
56. 760 F. Supp. 1015 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
57. Id. at 1023.
58. Id.
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Scherer also points to a number of the devastating effects of
homelessness to illustrate the loss of personal freedom that those
without permanent shelter experience. Homeless individuals are
more likely to suffer from chronic medical issues.5 9 Without access
to a healthy diet or the means to take care of personal hygiene,
homeless people with health problems such as epilepsy and diabe-
tes may have an extremely difficult time keeping these conditions
under control.6 ° The risk of contracting other illnesses is also high
for this population.61
Homelessness also has severe social consequences. Those who
lose their homes can also lose their connection to their communi-
ties, and the social and economic support that comes along with
community and kinship ties.62 Without a permanent address it is
also difficult for homeless people to vote or to find and keep a
job.63 Homeless children are subject to additional consequences,
including gaps in school attendance and removal from their parents
and siblings if placed in foster care.64
According to Scherer, the repercussions of homelessness make
up the liberty interest that is at stake for indigent families and indi-
viduals who are faced with the threat of eviction from their homes.
Viewed in this light, the potential loss to tenants can be compared
to the liberty interest at stake in criminal prosecutions where the
defendant risks incarceration.65
The second part of the Mathews test requires an analysis of the
risk of error in eviction proceedings, as well as the role that declar-
ing a right to counsel might have in alleviating this risk.66 The pos-
sibility of error in lopsided eviction hearings is large.67 While most
landlords are represented by counsel, most tenants facing eviction
are poor, and therefore unable to afford attorneys.68 Though there
59. Scherer, supra note 8, at 568 (citation omitted).
60. Id. (citation omitted).
61. Id. at 568 n.45 and accompanying text ("For example, a high incidence of se-
vere malnutrition, anemia, lice infestation and tooth decay have been documented
among homeless youth.").
62. Id. at 569 (arguing that these relationships are crucial to "one's sense of iden-
tity and well-being").
63. See id. at 569 (claiming homelessness at any age hampers a person's ability to
function as a productive member of society).
64. See id. (discussing the effects of community separation on children).
65. See id. at 563 (comparing the "equally devastating effects" of losses in criminal
courts, family courts, and housing courts).
66. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
67. See Scherer, supra note 8, at 571-73 ("[T]he unrepresented indigent tenant [is]
severely disadvantaged in her ability to defend an eviction case.").
68. See id.
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are a limited number of legal services available to indigent tenants,
most go through eviction proceedings pro se.69
The modern legal relationship between landlord and tenant is an
extremely complex one.70 Each party involved in an eviction pro-
ceeding has to deal with an intricate body of law, including housing
codes to protect the tenant, and legislation that limits landlords'
grounds for eviction.71 Mastery of these laws and regulations is
generally a prerequisite for either side to obtain a winning out-
come.72 It is not difficult to imagine a case in which an indigent
tenant is not aware of, or, for some other reason, is unable to pre-
sent in court valid legal defenses which could change the outcome
of a decision.73
Additionally, eviction hearings are adversarial proceedings that
require a specific knowledge of the rules of procedure and evi-
dence.74 The unrepresented, indigent litigant often does not have
any access to this knowledge or the time in which to educate her-
self about these rules. 75 Again, there is a high risk that a tenant's
absence of legal knowledge could lead to an incorrect outcome in a
case that will cost the litigant her home.76 Thus, the risk of error in
these proceedings is high.
Given the complex law involved in these proceedings, there is no
question that the side represented by experienced legal counsel has
a distinct advantage over the pro se litigant. 77 A Supreme Court
case, Lassiter v. Department of Social Services held that there was
no right to counsel in cases involving the termination of parental
rights, in part because the Court could not find a determinative
difference in outcomes resulting from having counsel for these pro-
ceedings. 78 In contrast, in their 2001 study on the impact of counsel
for poor tenants in New York City's housing court, Carroll Seron,
Gregg Van Ryzin, Martin Frankel, and Jean Kovath discovered
69. See id. at 572 n.59 (noting that only 20.8% of all tenants in New York City's
Housing Courts were represented) (citation omitted).
70. Id. at 569.
71. See id. at 570 (discussing various efforts of state and federal legislatures aimed
at aiding tenants).
72. See id. at 570.
73. See, e.g., id. at 557-58 (relaying a story of indigent South Bronx tenant who
probably would have avoided eviction if she had been represented by counsel).
74. See id. at 572 (discussing the "technical and complex nature" of eviction
proceedings).
75. Id.
76. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
77. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
78. 452 U.S. 18, 32-33 (1981).
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that the existence of legal representation had a large impact on the
outcome of eviction cases.79 Their research provided evidence that
the presence of legal representation for indigent tenants contrib-
utes to case resolutions that include fewer evictions and more rent
abatements and apartment repairs. ° Similarly, in his examination
of a study regarding eviction proceedings in New Haven, Connecti-
cut, Steven Gunn concluded that "legal services attorneys were
able to prevent or delay [tenant] evictions, helping the tenants ei-
ther to remain in their homes or to secure alternate housing with-
out suffering sudden dislocation or homelessness. ' 81
Though Scherer's Due Process analysis describes conditions ex-
isting more than twenty years ago, his article predicts that the pres-
ence of counsel would have a positive impact on the outcome of
eviction cases.82 His article identifies the heavy caseloads of hous-
ing courts as one factor that increases the disadvantage to the pro
se defendant.83 Heavy caseloads can lead courts to do less than
thorough examination of evidence and to implement time saving
devices that could violate the tenant's right to a fair hearing.84
High dockets can contribute to judicial failure to determine
whether unarticulated defenses exist. Scherer further argues that
the time pressures of court appearances and filings can intimidate
the inexperienced litigant (sometimes so much so that the litigant
agrees to an inequitable settlement). 86 Attorneys can mitigate the
effects of these time pressures and the risk of error in eviction pro-
ceedings by bringing forward legal defenses and counterclaims.87
Evaluating the third prong of the Mathews test, Scherer further
argues that no countervailing government interest outweighs the
liberty interest at stake, the risk of error, and the advantages of
having counsel in eviction proceedings.88 In fact, according to
Scherer, the government's primary interests should be to avoid
79. See Carroll Seron et al., The Impact of Legal Counsel on Outcomes for Poor
Tenants in New York City's Housing Court: Results of a Randomized Experiment, 35
LAW & Soc'y REV. 419, 419 (2001) (noting that only twenty-two percent of repre-
sented tenants had final judgments against them, while fifty-one percent of tenants
without legal representation had final judgments against them).
80. See id.
81. Steven Gunn, Eviction Defense for Poor Tenants: Costly Compassion or Justice
Served?, 13 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 385, 421 (1995).
82. See Scherer, supra note 8, at 573-76.
83. See id. at 573.
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. Id. at 573-74.
87. See id. at 575-76.
88. Id. at 576-79.
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wrongful evictions, to prevent the negative effects of homelessness,
and to ensure the quality of life of its citizens. 89 There are costs
associated with promoting these interests and the problem of lim-
ited resources must be addressed. 90 Despite these costs, Scherer
argues that the government savings resulting from the prevention
of homelessness and the provision of social services to fewer peo-
ple could offset the cost of providing counsel to indigents.91 When
all of these interests are balanced, Scherer argues that the cost to
the government of providing counsel would be outweighed by the
tremendous benefits representation in eviction proceedings would
provide.92
C. New York State Right to Counsel
Though the federal Due Process argument for the right to coun-
sel in civil cases has not yet been successful in court, there is sup-
port for the right to counsel for indigents in eviction cases through
the Due Process clauses in numerous state constitutions.93 As
Scherer notes, many state constitutions contain Due Process
clauses, and state courts have at times interpreted these clauses as
conferring broader rights than those bestowed by the federal Con-
stitution.94 For example, the New York Court of Appeals "has con-
strued broad protections from the 'unique language' of the state's
constitutional due process clause and given greater protection to
New York residents than those afforded in the U.S.
Constitution."95
In his article about eviction proceedings in New York, Karas ar-
gues that the courts should recognize the right to counsel for indi-
gent defendants based on New York State's Due Process clause. 96
Karas adds that "[w]hile the courts can do little to improve the
89. See id. at 577-78. Though increased access to counsel will certainly not cure
affordable housing shortages or homelessness, Scherer's argument is that providing
counsel and preventing wrongful evictions will at least be a big step in the right direc-
tion. Id. at 591-92.
90. See id. at 577.
91. See id. at 578-79.
92. See id.
93. See, e.g., Miss. Const. art. III, § 14 (1890) ("No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property except by due process of law."); NEV. CONST. art. I, § 8 (1864)
("No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.").
94. See Scherer, supra note 8, at 583.
95. See Karas, supra note 8, at 541 (citing Sharrock v. Dell Buick-Cadillac, Inc.,
379 N.E.2d 1169, 1173 (N.Y. 1978)); see also N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6 ("No person shall
be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.").
96. See Karas, supra note 8, at 543.
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New York housing market or public assistance programs, they can
demonstrate their commitment and obligation to preserve due pro-
cess of law by providing counsel for tenants faced with eviction."97
D. Provision of Expanded Legal Services
Those who argue that indigents have a legal right to counsel in
eviction cases, such as Scherer and Karas, present suggestions for
how the state could meet the demand for attorneys. 98 One option
is for states to expand current systems for appointing attorneys to
criminal defendants to include attorneys for civil cases.99 Such an
expansion would likely tend to replicate the problems that already
exist on the criminal defense side.100 In states where any member
of the bar can be appointed to defend an indigent client, the state
cannot guarantee a lawyer with expertise in the particular area for
which the client requires legal assitance.10 1 In states where courts
appoint attorneys who have voluntarily placed themselves on a list
of those willing to take indigent cases, the compensation from the
state for representing an indigent client is vastly lower than the
compensation that the lawyers could earn from a paying client. 102
Low rates serve to reduce the pool of competent attorneys who are
willing to take on these cases, and induce those who do to take on
as many cases as possible in order to make a living. 10 3 Thus, if this
system were adopted in civil cases, similar factors could contribute
to a lower quality of lawyering than is provided to the paying
client.
The state could also provide qualified attorneys to indigents in
housing cases by increasing funding for public legal services. Legal
services organizations cannot now meet the demand for represen-
97. Id. at 543.
98. See Scherer, supra note 8, at 589-91 (advocating the creation of a pool of vol-
unteer attorneys or, in the alternative, legislative funding for tenant representation);
see also Karas, supra note 8, at 556-61 (suggesting the solicitation of volunteer attor-
neys or mandatory court appointments).
99. See, e.g., Scherer, supra note 8, at 590 (concluding that such an expansion
would not be the most efficient solution).
100. See id; see generally Bright, supra note 2.
101. See Bright, supra note 2, at 789 (stating that judges may appoint attorneys who
try cases quickly rather than capably).
102. See DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS 253 (2001) (noting
that ceilings on fees for representing indigent clients can result in payment as low as
$2 an hour).
103. See id.
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tation in eviction proceedings. 104 If the courts were to recognize a
right to counsel, the legislature could accompany this finding with
an increase in funding for organizations that already have the
needed expertise for defending tenants in eviction hearings.
Though this may be appealing in theory, it seems unlikely to be
politically viable. 1 5
A third option for providing attorneys in civil cases, including
evictions, is for the state to rely on a scheme in which lawyers vol-
unteer their legal services free of charge. Unless the court en-
forced a system of mandatory pro bono service for attorneys and
law students, however, it is unlikely that supply could ever meet
demand. 10 6 The arguments for requiring all members of the bar to
provide free legal services to the poor are wide-ranging, and cer-
tainly go beyond the issue of recognizing a right to counsel in evic-
tion cases.0 7 Though the legal community has been engaged in
debate about instituting mandatory pro bono for decades and the
ABA has adopted Model Rule 6.1 which calls for the performance
of fifty hours a year of pro bono service, no state or federal govern-
ment has adopted such a system.'0 8
Though the provision of an adequate supply of attorneys for in-
digents in need of help with eviction proceedings would certainly
prove complicated, these complications do not weaken the doctri-
nal arguments for judicial-recognition of the right to counsel in
eviction cases. In fact, a judicial recognition of the right to counsel
could serve as incentive for politicians, lawyers, and scholars to
come up with creative and appropriate remedies for increasing in-
digents' access to legal services.
H. CRITIQUES OF RECOGNIZING A RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The arguments against recognizing a right to representation for
indigents in eviction proceedings go beyond questions about possi-
ble methods by which the state could provide such legal represen-
104. See Bindra & Ben-Cohen, supra note 7, at 4 (explaining that, although there
are legal resources available to indigent litigants in civil cases, the demand exceeds
the supply).
105. See id. at 4-5 (noting that those in power often view the pro bono initiatives
currently in place as sufficient to meet the needs of indigent civil litigants, thereby
rendering increased funding for such programs unnecessary).
106. See id.; Karas, supra note 8, at 557 (positing that "the supply of available attor-
neys will likely remain insufficient without a mandatory pro bono requirement").
107. See RHODE & LUBAN, supra note 102, at 761-74 (discussing an attorney's ethi-
cal obligation to provide pro bono services).
108. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 6.1 (2002).
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tation. Critics point to cost, increased incentive to litigate, the
likelihood that access to counsel will not rectify many structural
deficiencies in housing courts, and the possibility of increased ine-
quality within the justice system as reasons for not recognizing this
right.109 Though each of these critiques raises interesting problems,
none of them ultimately destroys the doctrinal support or the bru-
tal need for counsel for indigents facing the loss of their homes.
A. Government Cost
One critique of recognizing a right to counsel follows directly
from Scherer's position that the Due Process clause confers a fed-
eral right to counsel, and more precisely from the balancing test
put forth in Mathews v. Eldridge1 ° While Scherer and others ar-
gue that cost should be unimportant in a court's recognition of this
right to counsel,"1 one cannot ignore that the financial cost to the
government of providing legal services might arguably outweigh
other government interests in providing such services. A court
that finds that the government's interest in conserving resources
(or using resources in another manner) outweighs the personal in-
terests of people facing eviction from their homes, might reach a
different outcome than Scherer did in the Mathews balancing
test.
1 13
Proponents of the right to counsel make compelling arguments
that, no matter the cost, the government interest is served by the
provision of counsel to indigents and increased equality with re-
spect to access to justice. 1 4 Although the existence of limited re-
sources is an issue in recognizing any positive right, a judicial
109. See infra notes 110-75 and accompanying text.
110. See Scherer, supra note 8, at 563 (arguing that application of the three-pro-
nged Mathews test leads to the conclusion that indigent tenants facing eviction should
be appointed counsel).
111. See id. at 577-78 (stating that "cost alone should not deter the government
from vindicating important legal rights").
112. See Karas, supra note 8, at 547 (stating that if providing "the right to counsel
would involve mass expenditure of public monies, the courts could conclude that the
balance of interests, public and private, weigh against provision of counsel").
113. See id.
114. See Gunn, supra note 81, at 421 (concluding that counsel for indigents in evic-
tion proceedings provides an essential service to both individual tenants and society
as a whole); Karas, supra note 8, at 547 (arguing that the provision of legal services to
the poor in eviction proceedings would result in the government saving money by
reducing the amount that would need to be spent on services for the homeless);
Scherer, supra note 8, at 577-78 (concluding that the benefits, both social and finan-
cial, of providing free legal counsel to indigent tenants facing eviction outweigh the
fiscal costs).
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recognition of high cost as a legitimate governmental interest could
lead to the revocation of any number of rights, especially in times
of fiscal crisis. While advocates and policy makers would certainly
have to take government cost into account in creating an effective
system to ensure that a right to counsel is met, the financial cost to
government should not come into play in a court's determination
of whether such a constitutional right exists.115
B. Landlord Cost
On the surface, a more compelling economic argument addresses
the costs that a recognition of the right to counsel for tenants fac-
ing eviction proceedings would impose on landlords and, possibly,
tenants. In 1973, John Bolton and Stephen Holtzer published the
results of a study they had conducted concerning the effects of le-
gal representation for indigents in eviction cases in New Haven.1 6
Based on the results of this study, Bolton and Holtzer concluded
that providing legal counsel to defendants in eviction proceedings
actually increased the financial burden on poor people.
1 1 7
Bolton and Holtzer set out to assess the wider impact of legal
counsel in eviction cases in New Haven by comparing cases in
which tenants received free legal assistance with those in which te-
nants litigated pro se or were represented by private counsel.'
1 8
They examined the length of the eviction proceedings in cases
where the New Haven Legal Assistance Association ("LAA") pro-
vided tenants with legal representation, and concluded that the
presence of LAA counsel resulted in an increase in the amount of
time it took for eviction proceedings to take place.119 Bolton and
Holtzer argue that the time differential created by lawyers' zealous
representation of tenants puts financial burdens on landlords.12 °
Landlords facing tenants represented by counsel have increased le-
gal fees of their own, and they do not receive rent from tenants
pending the outcomes of these hearings. 121 These costs, according
115. See Scherer, supra note 8, at 577.
116. John Bolton & Stephen Holtzer, Legal Services and Landlord-Tenant Litiga-
tion: A Critical Analysis, 82 YALE L.J. 1495 (1973).
117. See id. at 1503.
118. See id. at 1495-97.
119. See id. at 1497-98 (noting that the time required for disposition when the ten-
ant was represented by a LAA attorney was over four times longer than when the
tenant was represented by a private attorney).
120. See id. at 1499, 1502.
121. See id.
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to Bolton and Holtzer, are then passed on to other tenants in the
form of rent increases and poorer quality in housing conditions.
1 22
Additionally, Bolton and Holtzer argue that free legal counsel in
eviction proceedings often does not alter the results. 123 They claim
that legal services lawyers usually represent tenants who are being
evicted for non-payment of rent and therefore have limited legal
defenses to eviction.124 Thus representation, while prolonging the
process and increasing costs, rarely actually prevents eviction. 125
Based on their observations about the complications with levels of
legal representation in 1973, it is likely that Bolton and Holtzer
would criticize the expansion of such services.
In response to the New Haven study and others like it, however,
Steven Gunn argues that the costs to landlords and tenants of rep-
resentation are overstated and can be explained by flaws in the
design of the studies. 26 To begin with, Bolton and Holtzer in-
cluded defendants who did not contest their evictions in their con-
trol group of unrepresented tenants.1 27 The group of represented
tenants obviously only includes those tenants who were contesting
an eviction. Since uncontested cases are quickly adjudicated, Bol-
ton and Holtzer's inclusion of these tenants in their control group
artificially enlarges the difference in length of cases where tenants
are represented and those where they are not. 128
Gunn points to another important methodological flaw within
Bolton and Holtzer's study. The authors of the study calculated all
cases where a landlord withdrew his action as successful evic-
tions.1 29 According to Gunn, this move seriously underestimates
the favorable outcomes that LAA attorneys brought about through
their representation. 130 When a landlord withdraws his eviction ac-
tion, it can often be because the parties have successfully negoti-
ated, and not because the tenant has agreed to vacate. 3 These
122. See id. at 1502-03.
123. See id. at 1498 ("[T]he landlord almost inevitably obtains judgment of
possession.").
124. See id. 1498 n.8, n.14 (discussing the limited defenses available in a summary
process action).
125. See id. at 1498 n.14 (noting that of the ninety-seven cases defended by LAA in
the sample, the tenant only obtained judgment in two).
126. See Gunn, supra note 81, at 387 (discussing the major problems in Bolton and
Holtzer's methodology).
127. Id.
128. Id. (arguing that a more appropriate control group would consist of unrepre-
sented tenants who contested their eviction).
129. Id. at 388.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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negotiations can include agreements for landlords to repair sub-
standard housing. 132  Gunn also adds that, while Bolton and
Holtzer are correct in their assertion that the majority of repre-
sented tenants were facing eviction for non-payment of rent, most
of them also had valid defenses or counterclaims. 33 Thus, accord-
ing to Gunn, while landlords might bear some costs if the judiciary
were to recognize a right to counsel, these costs do not outweigh
the overall benefits to indigent tenants or to society as a whole.13 4
C. Incentive to Litigate
Some critics oppose an increase in access to lawyers because of
fear over what they perceive as an overly-litigious society. 13 If the
right to counsel were absolute, critics say, then there would be
nothing to prevent indigent clients from bringing frivolous claims
or putting forth unmeritorious defenses. 136 Some legal scholars
have pointed out, however, that in countries where a right to coun-
sel in civil cases has already been recognized, the government has
devised successful systems by which to screen cases. 137 Addition-
ally, in eviction cases, the party with a lawyer has the opportunity
to bring any and all claims that she believes to have legal merit.
Giving this opportunity to the indigent defendant, whether or not it
increases litigiousness, is an important way for the courts to pro-
vide equal access. Finally, in eviction cases the tenant does not ini-
tiate the proceedings. Thus, while access to an attorney may
increase an indigent's incentive to fight back, it would not lead to
an increase in the number of cases brought to court.
D. Beyond the Risk of Homelessness
Scherer's Due Process argument relies on the example of a ten-
ant who becomes homeless because of an error in an eviction
case. 138 Thus, it addresses neither the larger issue of homelessness
that does not stem from a wrongful eviction, nor the problem of
132. Id.
133. Id. at 420-21.
134. Id. at 421.
135. See RHODE AND LUBAN, supra note 102, at 727 ("If parties had a right to
subsidized lawyers in any civil case, what would deter them from pursuing unmerited
claims and inflicting unwarranted costs, not only on the state.., but also on innocent
individual opponents?").
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See supra Part I.B (discussing a Due Process argument for recognizing a right
to council in eviction cases).
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tenants whose wrongful eviction would not result in homelessness.
Though it seems unlikely that any argument for increased access to
counsel could result in a solution to homelessness, it is possible to
make a Due Process argument for those tenants who do not face
homelessness as a result of eviction.
Though Scherer's description of the liberty interest at stake
when a tenant becomes homeless is compelling, focusing almost ex-
clusively on this harm weakens his argument. Instead of adopting
this approach, in her article Property and Personhood, Margaret
Radin uses the example of the relationship of a tenant to his rented
home to illustrate her conception of a "personhood" interest in
property.139 As she describes it, "[t]he premise underlying the per-
sonhood perspective is that to achieve proper self-development-
to be a person-an individual needs some control over resources in
the external environment.' 140
Looking at privacy-related jurisprudence, she argues that the
home can be seen as "a moral nexus between liberty, privacy, and
freedom of association. ' '114  While tenants' homes may be seen as
partially belonging to them because of the rent they have paid, and
partially belonging to the landlord, Radin argues that strong land-
lord-tenant laws actually reflect society's valuation of tenants' per-
sonhood interest in property as superior to a landlord's property
interest.142 This special relationship to the home, Radin argues,
goes beyond society's interest in providing a "sanctuary" for indi-
vidual liberty. 143 She maintains that society (and the courts) see
the home as "the scene of one's history and future, one's life and
growth." 144 Considering this conception of the home, one can see
how homelessness may be the most severe, though certainly not
the only interest at stake in eviction proceedings.
If the home is a space that embodies a person's history and fu-
ture, a forced separation from this physical space would almost un-
139. Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REv. 957, 991-92
(1982).
140. Id. at 957 (emphasis in original).
141. Id. at 991. Radin discusses the case Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), in
which the Supreme Court held that a state can not prosecute individuals for having
obscene materials in their home. Id. at 558. She argues that it is clear from this
decision that the Court was influenced by the traditional conception of the home be-
ing connected to autonomy and personhood. Radin, supra note 139, at 992.
142. Radin, supra note 139, at 992-93.
143. Id. at 992 (describing the state's invasion of the "sanctity of the home" as a
violation of one's personhood).
144. Id.
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doubtedly have negative psychological effects on a tenant. 45
Additionally, being forced out of one's home could dislocate a per-
son not just from the four walls of the home, but from the commu-
nity at large.' 4 6 Those who are evicted could lose their personal
connection to family, friends, and other neighbors, as well as to the
support networks that these people provide. 4 The argument for
the right to counsel in eviction cases could be bolstered if, in addi-
tion to describing the risk of homelessness, proponents pointed to
the possible loss of this personhood interest involved in evictions.
An argument that focuses primarily on the risk of homelessness
allows room for critics to argue that other reforms have alleviated
the need for the assistance of counsel. For example, in New York
City, where advocates have won a recognized right to housing for
homeless individuals, 48 the risk of homelessness after an eviction is
decreased. Thus, while a great need for indigents to have represen-
tation in eviction cases may still exist, the liberty interest at stake
would no longer appear to tip the scales in the Mathews test.
E. The Exaggerated Role of the Attorney
Other criticisms of focusing on a right to counsel stem from an
argument that such strategies rely on an exaggerated vision of the
power of the advocate. In her article about housing court in Balti-
more, Barbara Bezdek identifies the source of inequitable out-
comes as being broader than a lack of legal representation. 149 She
argues that the mostly female, black, and poor tenants15 0 that come
through the court are "silenced by dynamics occurring in and
around the court room. This is due both to differences in speech
and to dissonant interpretations between speakers and listeners,
since they do not share a culture of claiming."151 Bezdek's study
does point to better outcomes for tenants who had the assistance of
another person in housing court.152 This assistance, however, did
not have to come from a lawyer to produce a better outcome for a
145. See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 53-65 and accompanying text.
147. See id.
148. See Callahan v. Carey, 762 N.Y.S.2d 349, 349 (App. Div. 2003) (holding that a
1981 consent decree required New York State to provide temporary shelter to home-
less individuals).
149. See Bezdek, supra note 11, at 539-40 (offering a critique of the standard "ac-
cess to justice" analysis).
150. See id. at 540.
151. Id. at 536.
152. Id. at 562.
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tenant.153 This observation leads Bezdek to speculate that "quali-
ties other than legal representation" are important in overcoming
the silencing effect of housing court.154 Thus, while the presence of
an attorney may help an individual tenant articulate legal claims
and defenses, a recognition of the right to counsel might not signifi-
cantly alter the bias of the court towards landlords. 55
Persuasive arguments about the potential pitfalls of recognizing
a right to counsel for poor people come from Gary Bellow and
Jeanne Kettleson in their 1978 article about fairness in public inter-
est practice. 56 Bellow and Kettleson's argument grows out of an
understanding the inequities in the administration of justice in this
country, and the disadvantages that are largely borne by poor peo-
ple and other groups who do not have access to legal counsel. 57
Despite this understanding, Bellow and Kettleson express real con-
cern about a large scale expansion of the number of lawyers in-
volved in resolving disputes.158
Bellow and Kettleson begin their analysis discussing arguments
in favor of recognizing a right to counsel for indigents in civil
cases. 159 They point to the enormous gap between the demand for
legal services for the poor and the legal services actually provided,
and recognize that publicly-funded legal services can provide indi-
gent clients with their only opportunity for meaningful access to
and participation in the legal system.' 60
After pointing out the relative advantage in the justice system
for those who have counsel, however, Bellow and Kettleson pro-
ceed to argue that the provision of access to this counsel will not
effectively address the inequalities that are built into our system.16 1
They argue instead that lawyers, even in larger numbers, are un-
likely to substantively alter the balance of power in the United
States. 162 In fact, Bellow and Kettleson examine the possibility
that increased representation could potentially perpetuate the
153. See id. (noting that most in-court assistance is, in fact, given by non-attorneys).
154. Id. at 563.
155. Cf. id. (observing that "landlords' interests occupy the bench [in housing
courts] at every moment").
156. See generally Bellow & Kettleson, supra note 4.
157. See id. at 379.
158. See id. at 379-80.
159. See id.
160. See id. at 379.
161. See id. (noting that the legal disadvantages facing public interest lawyers are
"rooted in deeply entrenched patterns of inequality and exclusion").
162. Id. at 379-80.
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same inequalities of the system that lead to the need for publicly-
funded legal services. 63
Though Bellow and Kettleson agree that there is a short-term
benefit by providing attorneys to the poor, they maintain that the
bar and members of the legal profession cannot hope to provide
the poor meaningful access to justice until they reexamine the
repercussions of having an intensely adversarial, complicated, and
professionalized system.164 They argue that while expansion of this
system might seem like the best way to level the playing field, in
the long run, this expansion might actually "intensify the legal dis-
advantages that public interest law is supposed to ameliorate. 165
Bellow and Kettleson maintain that proponents of the right to
counsel for indigents in civil cases must consider the likelihood that
providing legal services to everyone in an unequal society "may
exacerbate the very problems of unfairness and inequality that ac-
cess is ultimately intended to resolve. 1 66
Bellow and Kettleson claim that arguments for recognizing a
right to counsel and for expanding the provision of legal services
tend to ignore the realities that accompany these services. 167 Be-
cause legal services lawyers often have the power to decide what
becomes defined as a "legal problem," as their numbers and fund-
ing increase, lawyers would tend to include more and more
problems within the universe of legally addressable issues.' 68 Sup-
ply would once again be dwarfed by demand, and the expansion of
legal services would simply replicate the problems with access that
currently exist, but on an even-larger scale.169 Thus, even if a court
were to recognize a right to counsel in civil cases, the problem of
scarcity, and the economic and social inequalities that go hand-in-
hand with this scarcity, would persist.170
163. See id.
164. Id. at 379 (arguing that the inherent flaws of our social and political institu-
tions present problems of scarcity and fairness that cannot be solved merely by inject-
ing more public interest lawyers into the system).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 379-80.
167. Id. at 380.
168. See id. ("[D]efinitions of legal need are not static.").
169. See id. (noting that "demand for services will increase to the limits of available
supply").
170. Id. at 383. The authors point out that disadvantaged clients often do not have
the resources to take advantage of litigation gains. Id. For example, a client who wins
a lawsuit requiring special education services for her child may not have transporta-
tion to parent conferences, easy telecommunication services to contact the school, or
money to pay for a lawyer who could help this child as he grows and his educational
needs change. Id. at 383 n.177.
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Instead of an expansion of legal services, Bellow and Kettleson
call for a re-conception of the role of the lawyer." t Though they
think that the bar should support the provision of more lawyers for
the poor in the short term, they argue that in order to create
change at this level, the ABA needs to amend the Model Rules of
Professional Responsibility. 17 2 They believe that the bar should al-
ter the code to proscribe one side taking advantage of the other
side's ignorance or inexperience with the law.' 73 Their vision of the
code would also demand that lawyers make efforts to prevent seri-
ous personal injury to any party, require attorneys who are going
up against pro se litigants to advise them how and why to get coun-
sel, and compel such attorneys to communicate to the court any
valid defenses that they reasonably believe could be available to
the unrepresented side.174 According to Bellow and Kettleson,
these changes would "remove a particularly unwarranted competi-
tive edge of those who are experienced in using legal institutions,"
no matter the size of the legal system. 175
III. SOLUTIONS FOR INDIGENT TENANTS
A. Beyond the Model Rules
Since Bellow and Kettleson made their arguments in 1978, poor
people and advocates have watched the federal government de-
crease its commitment to legal services and set limits on the way
that publicly funded providers are allowed to serve their clients.7
In this light, arguments about the futility of looking to the expan-
sion of legal services as a way to address inequities are more con-
vincing than ever. Bellow and Kettleson's model for change,
however, has flaws of its own. These flaws become particularly ap-
parent when examined in light of the arguments for a right to coun-
sel in eviction cases.
Lack of counsel for indigents facing the loss of their homes is
much more than an indicator of the inequities of our system of
171. Id. at 384-85.
172. Id. at 386-87. Since Bellow and Kettleson's article was published in 1977, the
Model Rules have been amended. These amendments, however, have not incorpo-
rated Bellow and Kettleson's proposed amendments.
173. Id. at 387.
174. See id.
175. Id.
176. See Legal Services Corporation Restrictions-Fact Sheets, at http://www.bren-
nancenter.org/programs/pov/factsheets.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2004) (presenting
fact sheets regarding the restrictions on funding from the Legal Services Corporation
for bringing class actions, representing aliens, and soliciting clients).
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justice. The deficiency of legal services for tenants is a reality that
leads to increased homelessness, poverty, and disenfranchise-
ment.177 As advocates have pointed out, tenants who have the as-
sistance of counsel fare better than those who do not in eviction
proceedings. 178 Therefore, though legal assistahce will not correct
all of the inequities in housing court nor the larger problem of
homelessness, and despite the potential pitfalls associated with in-
creasing the size of the adversary system, advocates must make ar-
guments that indigent tenants have a right to access legal advice
and representation. Bellow and Kettleson do recognize the need
to increase the adversarial system in the short term, but they de-
emphasize the necessity of providing lawyers for the poor in favor
of an emphasis on reforming the Model Rules. 179 Though it is cru-
cial for advocates to look at possibilities for long term systemic
change if they are truly committed to providing equal access to jus-
tice, in reality poor tenants do not have the luxury of relying on
idealistic procedural solutions to the problem of eviction.
While Bellow and Kettleson are rightfully cautious about em-
bracing a wholesale expansion of legal services to include attorneys
for poor people in all civil cases, they do not address the possibili-
ties of a slower, piecemeal expansion. Such an expansion would
require the courts to create a hierarchy of legal needs, and to de-
clare a right to counsel in areas where the need is the most press-
ing. The courts could erase the possibility of lawyers expanding the
universe of problems to be addressed by the legal system by
describing the problems (e.g. eviction proceedings) to be addressed
from the outset. In essence, this is what the Mathews balancing test
allows courts to do: evaluate the need for a right to counsel in spe-
cific areas. With these limits, Bellow and Kettleson would not be
able to subject the expansion of legal services to the same analysis
as the declaration of a right to counsel in general. The judiciary
could have a huge impact on peoples' lives by recognizing a right to
counsel in eviction proceedings, and they could do this without in-
creasing the number of issues resolved by the adversarial process.
In addition to de-emphasizing short term solutions, Bellow and
Kettleson rely too heavily on the ABA and the Model Rules to
precipitate a radical change in lawyers' perceptions of their roles.
In theory, the Model Rules are the governing ethical code of all
attorneys. In as much as the Model Rules reflect the aspirations
177. See supra notes 66-76 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
179. See Bellow and Kettleson, supra note 4, at 386-88.
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and ideals of the legal profession, the bar should amend them to
reflect any shift in understanding of the lawyer's role. But in light
of the marginalization of public service and ethics among lawyers,
it is unlikely that advocates could successfully use the Model Rules
to overturn deeply-entrenched understandings of the lawyer as a
zealous advocate and a player in an adversarial system. °
To create a widespread change in the lawyer's role, advocates
need to start their project at the training academies for the next
generation of lawyers. Law schools do teach professional responsi-
bility and ethics, but these topics remain "no better than a second
class subject in the eyes of students and faculty.' 18 1 Most law
schools do not even require students to take a legal ethics class
until their upper class years. 182 By the second year, students have
already taken a number of law classes, and their professors may
not have asked them to think about the Model Rules or other
sources of ethical standards while learning and applying legal doc-
trine. Thus, it is unlikely that a shift in the understanding of a law-
yer's role embodied in the Model Rules will have a large trickle
down effect on law students.
In order to make the changes in a lawyer's perception of her role
that Bellow and Kettleson recognize as necessary to promote
equality in the justice system, law school faculties and administra-
tors, along with practitioners, need to be on the front lines of any
push for change. Law schools need to place more emphasis on le-
gal ethics and change the content of such classes.' 83
If courts were to recognize the right to counsel for indigents in
eviction cases and in other situations where the stakes are similarly
high, many more attorneys could end up representing indigent cli-
ents and being forced to face the inequities that are built in to our
adversary system. Perhaps a critical mass of attorneys, confronted
with and frustrated by these inequities, would serve as the impetus
for a widespread recognition of the need for change in the lawyer's
role. In the meantime, however, it is crucial for us to look for sub-
stantive solutions to the lack of affordable housing and homeless-
180. See generally Russell G. Pearce, Lawyers as America's Governing Class: The
Formation and Dissolution of the Original Understanding of the American Lawyer's
Role, 8 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 381 (2001) (discussing the role of the modern
lawyer).
181. Russell G. Pearce, Legal Ethics Must Be the Heart of the Law School Curricu-
lum, 26 J. LEGAL PROF. 159, 159 (2001-2002).
182. Id. at 160 n.7.
183. See id. at 160 (discussing the place of ethics in law school curricula).
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ness that can make immediate and concrete differences in people's
lives.
B. Problem-Solving Courts and the Active Judge
Other substantive solutions that could produce better outcomes
for tenants lie in between the recognition of a right to counsel and
a complete transformation in the conception of the lawyer's role.
For example, in recent years, most states have experimented with
so called "problem-solving courts.' 1 84 Such courts are usually
structured to handle the whole range of a person's legal and social
issues at once, and to provide solutions to these problems that ben-
efit the community in which the courts are situated. 185 It is possible
that these courts, which generally aim to give voice to a litigant's
story, could alleviate the "silencing" problem identified by
Bezdek. 86 This might serve to reduce error and allow a forum for
a tenant's argument to be articulated without the presence of
counsel.
In a talk about the Harlem Community Justice Center, Rolando
Acosta, the presiding judge, discussed the benefits of handling
housing issues in a non-traditional court. 18 7 Through the Housing
Court that is part of the Justice Center, judges are able to "increase
the stability and improve the overall health of the housing stock in
Upper Manhattan . . . by linking tenants to service and benefit
providers, to city and state government and other local service
providers.118 8 In such courts, the judge and other court employees
take on the role of monitors, trying to ensure that the landlord re-
ceives the rent and the tenant receives decent housing. 189 Though
many states' attempts at problem-solving courts are still in the ex-
perimental stages, these courts may actually be able to help circum-
vent the risk of homelessness and the lack of affordable, decent
housing.
Additionally, judges who preside over traditional housing courts
where the average litigant is proceeding pro se may have the power
184. See generally Greg Berman & John Feinblatt, Problem-Solving Courts: A Brief
Primer, 23 LAW & POL'Y (2001), available at http:// www.courtinnovation.org/pdf/
prob-solvcourts.pdf.
185. Id; see also, Judith S. Kaye, Delivering Justice Today: A Problem Solving Ap-
proach, 22 YALE. L. & POL'Y REV. 125, 127-28 (2004).
186. See supra notes 150-55 and accompanying text.
187. See generally Roland Acosta, The Birth of a Problem-Solving Court, 29 FORD-
HAM URB. L.J. 1758 (2002).
188. Id. at 1762.
189. See id.
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to impact fairer outcomes. In his article addressing solutions to the
"pro se crisis," 190 Russell Engler argues that the traditional role of
the judge is based on the assumption that in an adversarial system,
both parties are represented by counsel. 191 Since this idealized ver-
sion of the system does not describe the reality of most housing
courts, Engler argues that it is appropriate for judges, mediators,
and clerks in these courts to reexamine their traditional roles.192
Though the traditional role of the judiciary is one of impartiality,' 93
Engler proposes that the housing court itself should provide help
to the unrepresented party and should explain to all parties why it
is giving more aid to one party than the other.194 This help can
consist of giving legal advice, calling witnesses, and conducting di-
rect or cross-examinations for the pro se litigant. 195 As Engler
states, a judge "must be as active as necessary to ensure that the
legal system's promise of fairness and substantial justice is not frus-
trated by the litigant's appearance without a lawyer. 19 6 A judge
who is willing to seek justice actively for the tenant in housing
court can fill some of the void left by the absence of counsel, thus
maintaining the overall impartiality of the system. 197
CONCLUSION
Overall, advocates make very strong legal, practical, and moral
arguments for a recognition of a right to counsel in eviction cases.
In order for the poor to have any sort of meaningful access to jus-
tice in complicated and high stakes eviction proceedings, it seems
crucial and just for the courts to recognize this right. As critics
point out, however, when we look towards expansion as a way to
solve social and political problems, we must be critical of the sys-
tem we are expanding. Advocates for expanding the right to coun-
sel must take precautions not to replicate the weaknesses of the
adversarial system, thus amplifying the system's negative effects
and its contribution to inequality. With a combined effort, how-
ever, the courts, law schools, and practicing professionals may actu-
ally create lasting change in a system which now produces so much
inequality.
190. Engler, supra note 6, at 1987.
191. See id. at 1988.
192. See id. at 1990.
193. See id. at 2023.
194. See id. at 2023-24, 2028.
195. See id.
196. Id. at 2028
197. See id. at 2028-31.
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